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I. INTRODUCTION
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricut-
tural Implement Workers of America v. State of Michigan (UAW)' is
the most recent interpretation of a plaintiff's evidentiary burden
under a Title VII claim of sex-based wage discrimination. UAW held
that job evaluation studies showing pay differentials between female
and male dominated jobs of equal worth are insufficient to prove in-
tentional discrimination. 2 The court's holding was not required by
previous case law and serves to make sex-based wage discrimination
claims more difficult to prove than other Title VII claims. A plaintiff
bringing a sex-based wage discrimination claim can no longer create
an inference of intent; the plaintiff must prove intent.
This Note examines those arguments addressing the issue of intent
and analyzes the effect of the court's holding.3 First, the Note in-
troduces the UAW case, its facts, and the arguments related to intent
that the court relied on. Second, this Note analyzes the court's justifi-
cations for holding job evaluations insufficient to prove discrimina-
tion. The Note focuses on the court's erroneous interpretation of
previous discrimination cases involving statistical evidence, the court's
unprecedented and unwise decision that employers should be able to
rely on the market to set wages, and the court's failure to consider
traditional considerations in allocating the burden of proof. The Note
then addresses the court's illogical concerns about imposing a wage
scale on employers. The Note concludes that the UAW decision effec-
tively denies employees their Title VII claims by disproportionately
increasing the plaintiff's burden in these cases.
Finally, the Note suggests that shifting the burden of proof to the
employer would permit employees to bring claims and still protect the
employer's interests. A model for this allocation is presented along
with a discussion as to how this shift would address valid concerns
raised by the court in UAW, including the employer's disincentive to
conduct job evaluation studies if the studies could be used to create an
irrebuttable presumption of discrimination.
1. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989).
2. Id. at 769.
3. This Note does not address the legislative history of either the Equal Pay Act or
Title VII. Congressional intent has already been the subject of exhaustive analy-
ses and further discussion at this point would only obscure this note's focus on the
element of intent in sex-based wage discrimination claims. For an analysis of the
legislative history of Title VII, see County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 190
(1981)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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II. BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating "against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion.., because of such individual's ... sex."4 Until 1981, the status of
wage claims under Title VII was unclear. Some contended these
claims could only be made if the plaintiffs were paid less for perform-
ing the same job. In 1981 the United States Supreme Court in County
of Washington v. Gunther ruled otherwise and held Title VII claims
of sex-based wage discrimination were not limited to the confines of
the Equal Pay Act.5 The Court held Title VII prohibited sex-based
wage discrimination regardless of whether the wage differential ex-
isted between employees holding the same or different jobs.6 The
Court did not, however, address the merits of the employees' claim in
the case. Instead, the Court merely noted that the plaintiffs should be
able to recover if they could establish the pay differential was due to
"intentional sex discrimination."7 The plaintiffs' evidentiary burden
was left unresolved. The nature of this burden has been the focus of
current debate.
By referring to "intentional" sex discrimination, the Court seemed
to allude to the disparate treatment theory of liability which had been
developed to address Title VII discrimination claims.S To bring a dis-
parate treatment claim, plaintiffs must allege an employer treats some
people less favorably because of their race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.9 In sex-based wage discrimination claims the plaintiff
must initially show a pattern or practice of intentional salary discrimi-
4. 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(1964). In its entirety section 2000e-2(a)(1) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....
5. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180-81 (1981).
6. Id. at 166.
7. Id. at 181 (emphasis added).
8. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1973).
Under section 2000e-2(a)(2)(1964), the courts have developed an alternate the-
ory of liability known as disparate impact. Disparate impact analysis relies not on
the employer's intent, but the effect of facially neutral employment practices that
disproportionately impact members of a particular group. Id.
Courts have limited application of this theory to discrimination in job place-
ment. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984). The court in
Spaulding argued that sex-based wage discrimination does not fit within the dis-
parate impact model which was developed "to handle specific employment prac-
tices not obviously job related, such as: employer's intelligence tests ... height
and weight ... requirements," among others. Id. at 707. Whether this narrow
application was necessary will not be addressed in this note.
9. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, n.15 (1973).
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nation against a particular sex.10
In general, a claim of intentional Title VII discrimination involves
shifting burdens of proof whether the plaintiff asserts racial, rleigious,
or sex discrimination. The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
by proving the employer's intent to discriminate." The defendant can
rebut the prima facie case by articulating "legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory" reasons for the difference in treatment.'2 The plaintiff then can
only prevail by showing the employer's explanation is a pretext for
discrimination. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's
explanation does not relate to or justify the defendant's conduct.13
Recognizing the difficulty plaintiffs face in proving intent, the
courts have allowed plaintiffs to create an inference of intent by estab-
lishing certain facts which eliminated some of the legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons an employer might have for treating the plaintiffs
in a different fashion.14 Under this approach, plaintiffs need to create
only an inference of intent, and a very uncertain one at that.
The facts in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green are indicative of
the uncertainty surrounding the inference of intent.15 In McDonnell,
a racial failure to rehire case, the Court held a plaintiff could create an
inference of intent by proving: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a minor-
ity group, (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for the job for
which the employer sought applicants, (3) the plaintiff was rejected,
and (4) the position remained open.16 The inference of intentional dis-
crimination created by these four elements is very uncertain; the in-
ference does not discount the possibility that an employee may have
been fired for engaging in illegal activities17 or because of personality
conflicts with other workers,' 8 yet the Court willingly inferred an in-
tent to discriminate.19 In addition, the Court in McDonnell allowed
the plaintiff to infer discriminatory intent by relying solely on infor-
10. Melani v. Board of Higher Educ. of New York, 561 F. Supp. 769, 772-73 (1983).
11. Molloy, Fourth Circuit Review, 38 WASH. LEE L. REv. 645,646 n.7 (1981). See also
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)(evidence of discrimina-
tory motive is critical in disparate treatment cases).
12. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1982).
14. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
15. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1982).
16. Id. at 802. The Court qualified its holding when it noted these elements did not
establish an inflexible standard. Id. at 802 n.13. According to McDonnell and its
progeny, the facts will vary in Title VII cases and the prima facie case set out in
McDonnell must therefore, vary in these different settings. Id.
17. Id. at 801.
18. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1981).
19. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1982). In Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) the Court articulated the reasons
for using the McDonnell inference: intent can be inferred" 'only because we pre-
sume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors.' Id. at 254 (quoting Furnco Construction
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
mation at the plaintiff's disposal.20
The Supreme Court has indicated statistical evidence alone can es-
tablish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination in racial hiring
and firing cases. 21 In Teamsters, the Supreme Court noted "[w]here
gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper
case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimina-
tion."22 Despite this language, the Supreme Court has not squarely
addressed the issue of the sufficiency of statistics because non-statisti-
cal evidence also existed in Teamsters.
Initially, the lower courts followed the Supreme Court's guidance.
In Melani v. Board of Higher Education of New York,23 a federal dis-
trict court decision, the plaintiffs proved a prima facie case of sex-
based wage discrimination by using statistics that showed a salary dif-
ferential between male and female employees. The statistics were
corrected for productivity-related factors such as years of service and
educational level (common variables in job evaluation studies). The
Fifth Circuit in Wilkins v. University of Houston 24 held that statistics
created a prima facie case when the numbers revealed that females
comprised eighteen of twenty-one individuals being paid less than the
lowest salary level for a particular job title.
Contrastingly, some lower courts have recently ignored the
Supreme Court's language in Teamsters and held statistics based on
job evaluation studies are insufficient to prove a prima facie case of
sex-based wage discrimination.25
In 1984, the court in Spaulding v. University of Washington ad-
dressed a discrimination claim brought by the faculty at the Univer-
sity of Washington School of Nursing against the University.26 The
nursing faculty sought relief by relying on statistics showing a pay dif-
ferential between the salaries in the School of Nursing and salaries
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). The Court also noted that the plain-
tiff's burden should not be "onerous." Id. at 253.
20. See the elements of a prima facie case of racial discrimination listed in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1982).
21. E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazel-
wood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
22. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977)(citing Inter-
national Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977)).
23. Melani v. Board of Higher Educ. of the City of New York, 561 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983).
24. 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated & remanded on other grounds 459 U.S. 809
(1982), aff'd on remand, 695 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1983).
25. E.g., International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers
of Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir 1989); American Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985); Ameri-
can Nurses' Ass'n v. State of Ill., 606 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986).
26. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984).
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paid in other academic disciplines. But, when the plaintiffs compiled
these statistics, the plaintiffs failed to take into account job experi-
ence, education, or job responsibility.
The Spaulding court held the plaintiffs' statistics were too unrelia-
ble and flawed to support an inference of intent to discriminate.27 The
court reasoned that relying on these statistics would subject employ-
ers to "standardless supervision" by the courts.28
In 1985 the Ninth Circuit in American Federation of State, County
& Municipal Employees v. State of Washington, (AFSCME), ad-
dressed a sex-based wage discrimination claim against the state of
Washington brought by state employees in female dominated jobs.29
The plaintiffs relied on a state commissioned job evaluation that sug-
gested state employees in female dominated jobs were paid approxi-
mately twenty percent less than those in male dominated jobs
considered to be of comparable worth. Job values were calculated us-
ing four criteria: "knowledge and skills, mental demands, accountabil-
ity, and working conditions."30
The AFSCME court denied the plaintiffs' claim asserting that the
court in Spaulding had established statistics were insufficient to prove
intentional discrimination3' and that the employer should be able to
take market rates into consideration when setting wages.3 2
In another 1985 decision, the court in American Nurses' Associa-
tion v. State of Illinois also held job evaluation studies were insuffi-
cient to prove intentional discrimination.3 3 The plaintiffs, various
nursing associations and a few individuals, asserted a sex-based wage
discrimination claim against the state of Illinois. The plaintiffs relied
on a job evaluation study commissioned by the state, but never imple-
mented. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim because the study did
not take into account market factors. The court also expressed strong
reservations about the court's competency to impose a wage structure
on the employer, a concern the court adopted from the Spaulding
decision.34
The Spaulding, AFSCME, and American Nurses' cases form much
of the support for the latest sex-based wage discrimination case. In
1989, the Sixth Circuit in UAW reaffirmed these other court decisions
by holding job evaluations insufficient to prove intentional
27. Id. at 703-04.
28. Id. at 701.
29. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d
1401 (9th Cir. 1985)(AFSCMR).
30. Id. at 1403.
31. Id. at 1403.
32. Id. at 1407.
33. American Nurses' Ass'n v. State of Ml1., 606 F. Supp 1313, 1316 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
34. Id. at 1318.
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discrimination.3 5
III. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,
AEROSPACE & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA v. MICHIGAN
A. Facts and Issues
In the early 1970s the state of Michigan realized its job classifica-
tion and compensation system had grown unwieldy. In 1975, Michigan
adopted what the Civil Service Commission thought was a much more
manageable classification scheme. To implement this system, the
state's Classification and Compensation Bureau first divided jobs into
eleven service groups that largely paralleled labor market occupa-
tional groups. The Bureau then divided each service groups into levels
and classes using the "Benchmark" system.
36
The Benchmark system evaluated jobs on five factors: "knowledge
requirements, nature of work, responsibility, personal relationships,
and physical effort/work environment."3 7 By assigning points for
each factor and adding up the points for each job, the Bureau was able
to rank jobs within service groups and assign the jobs to classes and
levels.
Implementation of the Benchmark system revealed some pay dis-
parities between male and female dominated jobs at the same class
and level. The state commissioned a comparable worth study. The
study compared jobs across service groups and revealed inconsisten-
cies in the assignment of service groups and in the application of the
five factors. The study reported that under the Benchmark system,
female dominated classes "were paid less than predominantly male
classes with similar. objective" job scores.38 The study did not reach
any conclusions about intentional discrimination.
Employees working in predominately female job classifications
filed suit in a class action against the state alleging sex-based wage
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.39 The employees claimed the state's Civil Service Commission
had intentionally discriminated against women by implementing a job
classification scheme that assigned lower wage rates to female domi-
nated positions. The plaintiffs argued the service groups were based
on gender and that jobs were placed in service groups depending on
whether they were dominated by males or females. For example, the
35. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989).
36. Id at 768.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2 (1964).
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plaintiffs pointed to the fact that the predominantly male class of li-
quor control clerks had been assigned to Labor & Trades even though
the job required clerical responsibilities. If assigned to Clerical, all the
wages of clerical workers might have been raised.4 o The employees
based their discrimination claim on the job evaluation study which
had revealed differences in pay for equivalent jobs.
The district court dismissed the claim after finding insufficient evi-
dence to establish intentional discrimination in the state's classifica-
tion system.41 The employees appealed the dismissal to the Sixth
Circuit where the lower court's ruling was upheld.42
B. Opinion
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs'
claim by holding that job evaluation studies were insufficient to prove
intentional discrimination.43 In support of its holding, the court cited
the Spaulding decision4 4 and expressly advanced many of the argu-
ments articulated by other courts. Relying on American Nurses', the
court in UAW asserted that judges lack competency to assign compara-
tive worth to jobs.45 The court implied that imposing a wage system
on the employer would constitute "standardless supervision." This ar-
gument can be traced to Spaulding.4 6
Relying onAFSCME, the court in UAW held that employers should
be able to look to the market to set wages.47 The court reasoned that
employers, as business people, must be given latitude to compete in
the marketplace. The court concluded that since job evaluation stud-
ies do not take market factors into account, the studies are insufficient
to prove discrimination.
The UAW court also faulted job evaluation studies for failing to
take into account "labor trends, economic predictions" and the "em-
ployer's economic health."48 The court set precedent when it ap-
pended this list by allowing employers to consider other factors "an
employer must weigh before implementing change."49
The court also sought to protect the employer's use of job evalua-
40. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 673 F. Supp. 893, 898-99 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
41. Id. at 898.
42. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1989).
43. Id. at 769.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
47. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1989).
48. Id. at 769.
49. Id. at 769-70.
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tion studies. The court noted, "to wield these studies as swords against
well-intentioned employers would quickly spell their demise."50
The following discussion analyzes these arguments and their ori-
gins and demonstrates the weaknesses of the courts' reasoning which
rejected the sufficiency of statistics based on job evaluation studies.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. UAWs misplaced reliance on Spaulding v. University of Washington
The UAW court argued job evaluation statistics "are insufficient to
establish intentional discrimination." 5 ' The court did not offer any ra-
tionale for its position, thus in evaluating the soundness of the court's
statement, it is appropriate to analyze the source of this holding.
UAW cites AFSCME for this proposition. Since the court in AFSCME
relied on an argument advanced in Spaulding, an analysis of the argu-
ment of Spaulding is illuminating.
The facts in Spaulding are distinguishable from those in UAW. In
Spaulding, faculty at the University of Washington School of Nursing
sued the university claiming sex-based wage discrimination. The
nurses sought relief by relying on statistics showing a pay differential
between salaries in the nursing school and those salaries paid faculty
members in other academic disciplines. The court criticized these sta-
tistics because the plaintiffs had concluded jobs were comparable
without taking into consideration job experience, responsibilities, or
education.5 2 After noting the unreliability of the plaintiffs' evidence,
the Spaulding court held that the statistics could not be used to infer
intentional discrimination.5 3 In light of the type of statistics being
evaluated, it is not clear from the court's holding that it intended to
discount the sufficiency of job evaluations per se or whether the court
merely wanted to discount unreliable statistics.
Succeeding courts have cited Spaulding for the proposition that job
evaluation studies are insufficient to infer intent without determining
the accuracy of the statistics in each particular case.54 In UAW, the
"statistics" involved were job evaluation studies that involved the
same variables the court in Spaulding felt were necessary to have "re-
liable" statistics. In UAW the study had weighed "five factors: knowl-
edge requirements, nature of work, responsibility, personal
relationships, and physical effort/work environment." The UAW
50. Id. at 770.
51. Id. at 769.
52. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 704 (9th Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 703.
54. E.g., American Nurses' Ass'n v. State of Ill., 606 F. Supp 1313,1318 (N.D. M. 1985).
55. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 768 (6th Cir. 1989).
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court took no notice of the different types of statistics involved in the
Spaulding decision and extended Spaulding by holding that job evalu-
ations are insufficient to prove intentional discrimination.56
In addition to the factual differences between the two cases, the
court in UAW further erred by relying on an opinion which suffers
from internal inconsistencies. The Spaulding holding suffers from
faulty reasoning because the court failed to offer a logical argument
supporting its conclusion that statistics cannot be used to infer
intent.5 7
B. Analysis of Spaulding v. University of Washington
1. Courts are easily misled by statistical evidence
The Spaulding court refused the nurses' claim because statistics
could be "exaggerated, oversimplified, or distorted to create support
for a position not otherwise supported by the evidence."58 The court
noted statistical evidence has an "inherently slippery nature."59 The
court seemed to reject the statistics because the court could not recog-
nize whether the numbers were being manipulated; the court was con-
cerned about being misled. After voicing its suspicions about the
statistics, however, the court immediately commenced a lengthy dis-
course addressing the problems with the nurses' statistics. In one
breath the court claimed it was incompetent to evaluate statistics, and
in the next, the court critically examined the very same statistics.
The court was not misled, but by pointing out the flaws in the sta-
tistical study, the court sought to reaffirm its position that statistics
have questionable evidentiary value. The flaw in this reasoning is that
simply because one study is faulty does not prove that all studies are
similarly faulty. The court's holding was correspondingly overbroad.
Instead of finding only faulty statistics insufficient to establish a prima
facie case, a holding which could be supported by the court's analysis,
the court held all statistics insufficient to prove intentional
discrimination.60
Even ignoring the inconsistent arguments advanced in Spaulding,
it is questionable whether judges should be able to reject statistics sim-
ply because they have difficulty understanding the numbers. Statis-
tics find general acceptance in many areas of the law. For example, in
antitrust cases, statistics alone are the relevant determinant in estab-
56. Id. at 769.
57. Id.
58. Spaulding v. University of Wash. 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir. 1984)(quoting Note,
Judicial Refinement of Statistical Evidence in Title VII Cases, 13 CoNN. L. REV.
515, 525 (1981)).
59. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir. 1984)(quoting Wil-
kins v. University of Houston, 695 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1983)).
60. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 703 (9th Cir. 1984).
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lishing the element of market power in a claim of monopolization in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.61 Although determining a
firm's market share is fraught with uncertainties, 62 courts are willing
to undertake the task even though multi-million dollar damage
awards depend on the out come. It is illogical to welcome statistics in
the context of antitrust litigation, but reject them in sex-based wage
discrimination claims
63
2. Job evaluations force courts to make standardless decisions
In addition to the Spaulding court's concern about being misled,
the court was also motivated by a concern that evaluating an em-
ployer's wage system would usurp the employer's prerogative in set-
ting wages. The court argued that judicial analysis would subject the
employer to "standardless supervision." 64 This argument is compel-
ling given the unreliable statistics offered in Spaulding. A court
which attempted to set wages without having any confidence in the
alleged value of the respective jobs would impose "standardless super-
vision" on employers. Given the facts, the court's refusal to impose a
wage on the employer was justified.
The court in UAW ignored the reasoning behind the Spaulding de-
cision, and as in American Nurses', assumed the use of any statistics to
set wages would constitute arbitrary interference by the courts.65 The
court in American Nurses' read the Spaulding decision to mean imple-
mentation of an evaluation system previously conducted by the em-
ployer would always constitute standardless supervision by the
courts.66 This is a broad construction, for the court in Spaulding only
questioned statistics generated by employees, not evaluations of worth
generated by the employer.
The UAW court supported its position by asserting that the validity
61. United States v. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
62. The market share depends on how the relevant product and geographic markets
are defined. These definitions are the source of much litigation because the more
broadly the market is described, the smaller a firm's market share and the less
likely monopolization can be established. Courts use "slippery" variables like
consumer perception, pricing relationships, and the rate of return to arrive at an
exact (albeit somewhat uncertain) percentage. Id.
63. The Supreme Court has implied that courts are competent to evaluate statistics
in Title VII discrimination claims. In Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299, 304-05 (1977), the Court evaluated and accepted statistics which
showed the percentage of Negroes hired for teaching positions was much lower
than the percentage of qualified Negroes searching for jobs in the relevant mar-
ket. The Court then specified exactly what statistics the employer could intro-
duce to rebut this prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 312.
64. Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 701 (9th Cir. 1984).
65. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 768-69 (6th Cir. 1989).
66. American Nurses' Ass'n v. State of Ill., 606 F. Supp 1313, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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of a job evaluation system rests on value judgments.67 The court felt
compelled to deny claims of discrimination based on such studies
"[b]ecause jobs do not have an intrinsic value that can be scientifwaZly
measured."68 This argument fails in the context of sex-based wage
discrimination claims because the plaintiffs are not asking the court to
arbitrarily set a wage. The court is merely asked to mandate that an
employer apply the same compensation structure in female dominated
jobs as the employer applies in male dominated jobs.69
Courts readily choose between two compensation systems when
they address equal work claims and direct the employer to pay the
plaintiff the same wages as others in the same job. Courts are not
asked to place dollar amounts on what experience, education, or re-
sponsibility are worth to an employer. The employer has already de-
cided what these variables were worth when it set wages. By
introducing evidence of wage discrepancies, the plaintiff asks the court
to abrogate the separate compensation structure maintained for fe-
male dominated jobs. Whether the value of jobs can be scientifically
measured is irrelevant. Setting the value of labor remains the em-
ployer's prerogative.
The court in American Nurses', however, may have been referring
to a problem addressed earlier in the reasoning process, i.e., how does
the court recognize separate compensation systems? This comparison
does pose some problems for the court, but note, under traditional Ti-
tle VII analysis, plaintiffs were not required to conclusively establish
discrimination with statistics; they only had to prove a prima facie
case. As already discussed, prima facie cases of racial hiring and firing
were fraught with uncertainty but were nevertheless accepted. The
court in UAW did not explain why a high degree of uncertainty is ac-
ceptable in all Title VII claims except for those involving sex-based
wage discrimination.70
Notwithstanding the rather unique treatment reserved for sex-
based wage discrimination claims, the refusal to accept job evaluation
studies because job values cannot be scientifically measured is ground-
less. The courtroom is not a laboratory in which only object facts are
deemed relevant. Judges may prefer objective facts, but they repeat-
edly have been willing to accept less than objective standards. For ex-
ample, questions of reasonableness are not absolutely objective, yet
judges have set the salaries of corporate directors by asking "what is
67. Id.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Clauss, Comparable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundatio, and The Feasibility
of Implementation, 20 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 7,18-34 (Fall 1986).
70. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1989).
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reasonable compensation?"71 Courts have even used "ability," a com-
mon factor in job evaluation studies, to arrive at a director's salary.
72
Similarly, in personal injury suits, judges have been willing to set
damage awards for pain and suffering.7 3 When juries award pain and
suffering damages, the judge retains the ultimate authority and can
remand for a new trial if the judge believes the damages are exces-
sive.74 Denying judicial competency to compare jobs with factors laid
out in a job evaluation study conducted by the employer is inconsistent
in light of the courts' reliance on judicial discretion in other areas of
the law.
C. Analysis of American Federation of State, County & Municipal
Employees v. State of Washington
The court in UAW also denied the plaintiffs an inference of intent
through the use of statistics because job evaluation studies do not take
market factors into account.75 The court in UAW relied on AFSCME
for this proposition.
76
By recognizing a market defense, the court in UAW again ad-
dressed sex-based wage discrimination claims differently than other
discriminatory compensation claims. A market defense was never rec-
ognized in Equal Pay claims. 77 An employer could not pay female
workers less than male workers doing the same job simply because
women were willing to work for less than men.78 Likewise, an em-
ployer could not justify paying lower wages to non-white employees
than wages paid to white employees simply because the non-white em-
ployees were willing to work for lower wages. 79 However, according
to the court in UAW, if the jobs are different, the employer can use a
market defense. The court never explained this distinction.
After the UAW decision, a plaintiff can no longer create an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent when the employer pays wages approxi-
mating the market rates. The market has become an absolute defense
because its presence means it is no longer "more likely than not" the
pay difference is due to "impermissible factors." The UAW court indi-
71. Wilderman v. Wilderman, 315 A.2d 610 (Del. Ch. 1974).
72. Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 39 Del. Ch. 563, 170 A.2d 720 (1961).
73. E.g., Martin v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 6 (D. Ariz. 1979)
74. E.g., Weeks v. Holsclaw 306 N.C. 655, 295 S.E.2d 596, 601 (1982).
75. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 770 (6th Cir. 1989).
76. See id. at 769. This Note will not analyze the arguments advanced inAFSCME for
recognizing a market defense. The Note focuses, instead, on the debilitating ef-
fect the market defense has on the plaintiffs' ability to meet the burden of proof.
77. E.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974); Hodgson v. Brook-
haven Gen. Hosp., 436 F.2d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 1970).
78. Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 493 F.2d 896, 902 (5th Cir. 1974).
79. Bazemore v. United States, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
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cated it would defer to the employer's economic decisions, and it was
willing to presume these decisions would be nondiscriminatory.8 0
D. UAW moves beyond American Federation of State, County &
Municipal Employees v. State of Washington
In AFSCME, the court criticized evaluation studies because the
studies do not take into account certain market factors such as the
supply of workers willing to do the job and the effectiveness of collec-
tive bargaining in a particular industry.81 The court in UAW supple-
mented the market defense with other possibilities including "labor
trends, economic predictions, the employer's economic health and
other factors an employer must weigh."82 Therefore, the UAW court
viewed sex-based wage discrimination claims differently than other
Title VII discrimination cases. The UAW court expanded the number
of "legitimate" defenses in an unprecedented fashion. In equal pay
and racial discrimination claims, courts allowed plaintiffs an inference
of intent despite the possible existence of other "legitimate nondis-
criminatory reasons" for the differences in treatment.8 3 The court in
UAW refused to grant the plaintiffs a similar inference in sex-based
wage discrimination claims.
The UAW court also refused to delineate when a court should and
should not infer intent. By recognizing an open-ended number of le-
gitimate defenses, the court was implicitly holding that there can be
no inference of intent in sex-based wage discrimination claims. An
employee is only given the opportunity to directly prove rather than
infer intent. Since an employer is very unlikely to make an overtly
discriminatory statement,8 4 the employee often faces an impossible
burden.
Given the recognized need for flexibility in establishing the burden
of proofS5 and the legal history of inferring intent, the UAW court's
decision was unjustified. A variety of cases can be brought under Title
VII, and it is within each court's discretion to set up the burden of
proof. Neither the UAW holding nor the precedents UAW relied on
took into account the traditional considerations other courts have used
to allocate the burden of proof. These considerations should have
been addressed because the evidentiary burdens had never been ex-
80. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am., 886 F.2d 766, 769-70 (6th Cir. 1989).
81. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. State of Wash., 770 F.2d
1401, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
82. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1989)(emphasis added).
83. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981).
84. Gates v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397 (D. Or. 1970).
85. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
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amined in a sex-based wage discrimination claim.86 The sex-based
wage discrimination claim was first recognized in 1981, however,
neither UAW nor the prior holdings UAW relied on ever addressed
the appropriate burdens of proof.
E. Common Law Allocations of the Burden of Proof
When a statute such as Title VII does not indicate the burdens of
proof, the courts must step in and make the allocation. Through the
years courts of general jurisdiction have developed criteria for deter-
mining who should bear the burden of proof and what the prima facie
elements of a claim should be. Among the factors considered are: best
evidence,8 7 public policy, fairness, and reducing the number of nega-
tives that must be proven. UAW and the precedents it relied on ig-
nored these common considerations.
One principle that has guided courts for years is that no party
should be forced to prove a negative.88 But, under the existing proof
structure, employees in sex-based wage discrimination claims must
prove negatives. Lacking an outright statement of discriminatory in-
tent by the employer, the employee can only advance a discrimination
claim by showing the wage differential is not due to any other nondis-
criminatory factor. For example, the employee must prove the differ-
ence in pay was not due to a difference in experience, education,
seniority, etc.
On its face this argument may appear to be an exercise in seman-
tics, for any element can be stated in both positive and negative
form.8 9 Courts have realized this proposition and have sometimes re-
quired a party to prove a negative. Nevertheless, the employee should
not be required to disprove all the possible legitimate justifications for
a pay differential.
One commentator, Professor Kevin W. Saunders has suggested
that what motivates a court's dislike of negative proof is not the nega-
tive quality, but the fact the plaintiff is asked to prove a "universal
proposition." 90
For example, here are two statements analogous to those Saunders
proposed: (1) the wage difference is not due to experience and (2) the
86. Consideration of the common law allocations of the burdens of proof was neces-
sary as the Supreme Court in Gunther recognized in 1981. In Gunther, the Court
noted plaintiffs should be permitted to prove discrimination even though the
claim was not based on equal work. County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161
(1981).
87. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
88. Saunders, The Mythic Difficulty in Proving a Negative, 15 SETON HALL L. REV.
276 (1985).
89. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN-
FoRD L. REv. 5 (1959).
90. Saunders, supra note 88, at 281.
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wage difference is not due to any nondiscriminatory factor.91 Both of
these statements can be characterized as being negatives, but the first
is much easier to prove than the second because in the second, the
plaintiff must address a large universe of factors. With the first state-
ment, the plaintiff need only contend with "experience." Saunders
calls the first statement an existential proposition and the second
statement a universal proposition.92 Plaintiffs alleging sex-based wage
discrimination must prove universal propositions-a nearly impossible
task.
UAW made the plaintiff's burden even more difficult to bear when
the court left the number of legitimate factors open-ended by includ-
ing market forces "and other factors an employer must weigh."
9 3
This open-endedness is UAW's contribution to the comparable worth
debate, and the decision demonstrates that courts are reluctant to en-
tertain these claims. Saunders noted that as the "universe of dis-
course" grows, the difference in the difficulty of proof between
universal and existential propositions increases.9 4 Because statistics
are often an employee's only avenue of proof, the employee has no
recourse but to attempt to use these statistics to discount all the possi-
ble legitimate justifications for a pay differential. This is an effort
deemed to failure at the outset.95 In contrast, the employer, by having
access to its own internal management decisions, could much more
easily prove the absence of discrimination.96
Policy considerations also militate against the existing burden of
proof. Given the broad remedial policy behind Title VII,97 and the
fact that women earn only fifty-nine cents for every dollar men earn,9 8
the UAW court's decision to skew the burden of proof in favor of the
the employer is difficult to justify.
V. UAW'S IMPLICATIONS
A. Effect of UAW
The court in UAW held job evaluations are insufficient to prove
91. See id. at 279.
92. Id. at 281.
93. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1989)(emphasis added).
94. Saunders, supra note 88, at 281.
95. United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
96. While the courts never voiced a "best evidence" concern in Title VII claims, this
theory adequately justifies the courts' concern with flexibility. E.g., International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Courts have required
employees to bring the evidence the plaintiffs had at their disposal.
97. S. REP. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1964).
98. WOMEN's BuREAu, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, FAcm ON
WOMEN WORKERS, 2 (1982).
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sex-based wage discrimination.99 The court followed precedent de-
spite the absence of any compelling reason for rejecting job evalua-
tions as proof of sex-based wage discrimination. The court increased
the plaintiff's burden by recognizing that the employer should be able
to make decisions based purely on economics. The court also in-
creased the number of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for wage
differentials. The net effect of the UAW decision is a reduction in the
evidence available to the plaintiff and an increase in the number of
defenses available to the employer.
Undercompensated employees in female dominated jobs must pa-
tiently wait until the employer either corrects the wage discrepancy
voluntarily or until upper-level managers make an overtly discrimina-
tory comment regarding gender and compensation. Without such a
statement, plaintiffs have virtually no chance for success in the courts.
Meanwhile, employees in female dominated jobs continue to earn ap-
proximately fifty-nine cents for every dollar earned by employees in
male dominated jobs.100 Obviously, the existing allocation of the bur-
den of proof is defective and in need of revision, at least if courts want
to give plaintiffs redress for undercompensation when plaintiffs hold
jobs dominated by females.
B. Suggestions
One solution might be to abrogate the "intent" element altogether.
Courts could shift their focus from the causes of discrimination to its
effects. The employer could then seek to justify the employment
practice by addressing the causes of the disparity in wages. This sug-
gestion would shift the burden of proof to the defendant with the fol-
lowing questions remaining: (1) What is the employee's initial burden
and (2) What is the employer's burden once the employee has proved a
prima facie case of discrimination? A brief look at a decision handed
down by the European Court of Justice will suggests answers to both
questions.
In Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v.
Dansk Arbejdsgiverfocening, (Danfoss), the European Court of Jus-
tice shifted the burden of proof to the employerlol In Danfoss, the
plaintiffs were alleging sex discrimination based on a 6.85% wage dif-
ferential between workers within the same pay grades. The court
held:
99. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Work-
ers of Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1989).
100. WOMEN'S BUREAU, supra note 98, at 2.
101. Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v. Dansk Arbejd-
sgiverfocening (acting for Danfoss); 1989 IRLR 532 (1989 Eur. Ct. Just.)
(Danfoss), (LEXIS, Comcas Library, All file), (all cites will be made to Lexis
pages), 13.
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Where an undertaking applies a pay system which is characterised by a
total lack of transparency, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that
his pay practice is not discriminatory. Where a female worker establishes, by
comparison with a relatively large number of employees, that the average pay
of female workers is lower than that of male workers.1 0 2
By "transparent" the court was referring to the ease with which
employees could identify the wage criteria. The court justified its
holding by recognizing workers had no way of knowing which criteria
were applied to them or how the criteria were applied.10 3 Employers
had access to this information.
The Danfoss case suggests employees can meet their burden by
showing: (1) differences in pay between predominantly male and fe-
male based jobs and (2) either a pay scale without indentifiable wage
criteria or a job evaluation study indicating equal worth.104 Proof of
these two elements would create a rebuttable presumption of sex
discrimination.105
The employer could rebut this presumption by proving the differ-
ential is due to an objectively justified factor. Justification would re-
quire (A) proof that the criterion is important in the performance of
the employee's specific duties and (B) proof that the criterion has been
applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion.'0 6
A brief explanation of these elements should clarify the issue. The
Danfoss court held that the "quality of work" could not justify a pay
differential between employees holding jobs of otherwise equal value.
While quality of work is generally accepted as important in job per-
formance, the employer's application of this criterion would not be ac-
cepted. As the court in Danfoss noted, "[1]t is inconceivable that the
work carried out by female workers would be generally of a lower
quality"10 7 than that of male workers. The criterion must have been
102. Id. at 13.
103. Id. at 11-13.
104. Id. at 13. Possibly the European Court of Justice did not intend its holding to be
broadly interpreted. The court was addressing pay differences between workers
in the same pay grade. A narrow holding might require employers to apply
whatever wage system the employer selects in a nondiscriminatory manner. At
this time, the court has not defined the limits of its holding. As the purpose of
this note is not to conduct a comparative analysis of the American and European
approaches to sex discrimination, the broad holding suggested in the text will
suffice for purposes of discussion.
105. Id. at 11-13. While some theorists have expressed concern that an employer
would never be able to meet its burden, see Nelson, Opton, Jr. & Wilson, Wage
Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MiCH.
J.L. REF. 233, 280 (1980), employers would not be limited to job evaluations but
could focus instead on one nondiscriminatory factor that explains the wage differ-
ential. The courts could recognize many legitimate factors as they seem wont to
do without holding the employee to an impossible standard.
106. Id. at 11-12.
107. Id. at 11.
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applied in a discriminatory manner.
If, however, an employer could prove "adaptability of workers to
variable work schedules" was highly advantageous in a particular job,
the employer might prevail.108 This criterion might legitimately dis-
criminate against women because women arguably have more respon-
sibility for time-consuming family duties that are not conducive to
flexible work schedules.1 0 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The court in UAW denied a sex-based wage discrimination claim
arguing that a contrary holding would give employers a disincentive to
conduct job evaluations.110 The UAW court recognized job evaluation
studies play an important role in setting wages, and an employer
would be less likely to use this tool if studies could be used against the
employer. This argument finds support in Great Britain's experiences
with its Equal Pay Act of 1970 which required equal pay for individu-
als who were doing work rated as equivalent by job evaluation stud-
ies."' After the Act had been adopted, studies revealed that the
greater the proportion of women employed, the less likely an em-
ployer was to have a job evaluation scheme.112 The result of using job
evaluation studies, however, is not as preordained as the British sys-
tem suggests. Employers may indeed curtail the use of such studies if
they create an irrebuttable presumption of discrimination, but em-
ployers may find the studies helpful if they can also be used to rebut
prima facie cases of discrimination. Under the model patterned after
the Danfoss case, an employer might be able to justify the wage dis-
crepancy with a job evaluation study.
The approach suggested in Danfoss is meritorious because it con-
forms to the common law standards for allocating the burdens of
proof. The employer need only prove an existential proposition to dis-
pense with the claim. For example, the defendant need only prove the
difference in pay was due to varying degrees of experience. The shift
provides the employer a defense while still allowing plaintiffs in un-
dercompensated female dominated positions a realistic chance for suc-
cess. The UAW decision demonstrates that evaluating Title VII claims
of sex-based wage discrimination under a method requiring proof of
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id.
110. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of
Am. v. State of Mich., 886 F.2d 766, 770 (6th Cir. 1989).
111. THE EQUAL PAY ACr OF 1970, c.41, § 1 as amended.
112. W. DANIEL & N. MULLWARD, WORKPLACE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN BRITIAN,
205 (1983); see also S. WILLBORN, A SECRETARY AND A COOK; CHALLENGING WO-
MEN'S WAGES IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITIAN, 162-63,
n.3 (1989).
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"intent" is outmoded and ineffective in attacking the wage gap. With-
out being able to infer intent, employees trained for jobs that have
been and continue to be dominated by females cannot look to the
court for relief.
Christine Y. Martin '92

